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1. Introduction
We outline in this chapter some of our present ideas about consciousness in
general and visual consciousness in particular. For now, we believe that the most
productive research strategy is to focus on the neuronal correlates of
consciousness (NCC). The next step is to  establish the exact nature of the causal
relationship between neuronal events and subjective feelings and, finally, to
understand the thorny philosophical problem of qualia or subjective feelings and
how they can arise out of certain physical systems. We assume that higher
mammals, such as rodents or primates, share certain forms of sensory
consciousness with humans, even though these animals lack language skills.
To characterize the NCC, we have to contrast neural activity that directly
gives rise to conscious sensations, thoughts or action with neural activity that is
associated with unconscious, stereotyped and on-line visuo-motor behavior. Where
is the difference between these forms? How do these differences in activity
relate to the ventral and dorsal streams? We emphasize the importance of explicit
representations, the idea of essential nodes in a network and whether such nodes
correspond to the columnar properties of a patch of cortex. We also discuss
whether the correlated firing of a set of neurons is needed for consciousness and
the role of cortical area V1 and prefrontal areas in consciousness. We end by
briefly describing some of the relevant experiments. For earlier versions of these
ideas, see (Crick and Koch, 1998 and Koch and Crick, 2000).
2. Prolegomenon to any Study of Consciousness
The most puzzling aspect of vision and visual perception is that it frequently gives
rise to conscious seeing: to the vivid sense of a hot pink shirt, the sight of the face
of a loved one or the profound sense of depth when gingerly stepping up to the
edge of a bluff.  After a hiatus  of half  a century or  more (e.g. Westheimer,
1999),  the physical origins  of consciousness are being, once again, vigorously
debated innumerous books and monographs published in  the last decade.  What is
it that we can we ascertain  about the neurobiological  basis  of consciousness, in
particular visual consciousness, and what can we reasonably assume at this point in
time? Neuroscientists   have made    a  number  of working assumptions that, in the
fullness of time,  need to be justified more fully.
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Firstly, and most importantly, that there is something to be explained. That
the subjective content associated  with a conscious sensation exists and has its
physical basis in the brain. Philosophers refer to this as qualia, what-it-is-like, the
aboutness of consciousness and other terms. At this point in time, no even
remotely satisfactorily accounts as to why brains can produce subjective feelings
have been made. Our strategy is to focus for now on other aspects of qualia where
progress can be made.
There is general agreement that much of consciousness is private.  I cannot
convey to you exactly how red looks to me, even if experiments show that you and I
respond to colors in a very similar way.  We have  claimed (Crick and Koch, 1995a)
that this is because, at each stage of processing in the cortex, the information
symbolized is re-coded, so that the more internal neural activity is only expressed
very indirectly in any motor output, such as speech.  On the other hand a person
can say whether two similar shades of red appear identical or not.  It is not
surprising that much of the content of consciousness is largely private.  What is
mysterious is the exact nature of these internal experiences.
Secondly, consciousness is one  of the principal properties of the  human
brain,  a  highly  evolved system.  It  therefore must  have  some useful function
to perform.  It is extremely unlikely that the well-structured nature of conscious
representations are  epiphenomena without any causal function as sometimes
asserted by philosophers. We (Crick and Koch, 1995b) assume that the function of
visual consciousness is to  produce the best current interpretation of the visual
scene---in the light  of past experiences---and to make it available, for  a
sufficient time, to  the parts of the brain which contemplate,  plan  and execute
voluntary  motor outputs  (including language). This  needs to be  contrasted with
on-line or zombie behaviors that bypass  consciousness   but  can  generate
stereotyped motor outputs (see below).
Thirdly, at  least   some   animal   species   possess some    aspects    of
consciousness. In particular, this is assumed to be true for non-human primates,
such as the  macaque monkey.  Visual consciousness is likely to be similar  in humans
and monkeys for several  reasons.  (1) For most sensory    tasks (e.g. for visual
motion  discrimination as discussed in the chapters by Albright & Dobkins, Britten
and Orban) trained monkeys behave as humans   do under  similar conditions, (2)
The gross neuroanatomy of humans and non-human primates is the  same  once  the
difference in size  has  been  accounted for. This is not to deny differences in the
microcircuitry nor the existence of cell types unique to human and great apes
(Nimchinsky et al., 1999). (3) As emphasized throughout this handbook, functional
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brain imaging in humans is confirming the existence of a functional organization
similar to that characterized by single cell  electrophysiology in the monkey.
As  a  corollary,  it follows that neither language nor a highly developed
sense of the self or of others is necessary  for  consciousness  to occur. Indeed,
even severely autistic individuals can carry out very complex sensory discrimination
tasks and show no evidence of deficits in sensory discrimination or detection tasks,
conscious or not (Baron-Cohen, 2001). Of course, language does enrich
consciousness considerably, but there is little hard evidence that it is necessary
for conscious sensations to occur.
3. Conscious and Non-Conscious Visual Behaviors
We can state bluntly the question that neuroscience must ultimately answer: It is
probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in our head correlate
with consciousness, while others do not; what is the difference between them? We
refer to the minimal neuronal mechanisms necessary and sufficient for any one
specific conscious percept as the neuronal correlates of consciousness (or the
NCC). We believe that at this point in time, it is empirically most profitable to seek
to identify the NCC and to defer many of the other problems (such as qualia).
It is critical to distinguish levels of consciousness (as in drowsy versus
awake) from the NCC associated with a specific phenomenal content. This
distinction reflects everyday experience of the distinction between being
conscious versus unconscious, on the one hand, and being conscious of a high C
versus not being consciousness of this tone. Enabling factors  are required for any
conscious sensation to occur without reflecting any specific one.
Cognitive  and  clinical  research  demonstrates   that much   complex
information processing can occur without involving consciousness.   In normal
subjects,  such unconscious processing includes priming, many aspects of oculo-
motor behaviors, the implicit recognition of complex sequences, posture
adjustment,  and many highly trained behaviors, such as driving, climbing, dancing,
playing tennis and so on (Velmans,  1991; Koch and Crick, 2001).
Milner  and Goodale (1995) make a masterful case for the  existence of so-
called on-line actions that by-pass  consciousness (see also Rossetti, 1998). Their
function  is   to   mediate  relative stereotyped  visuo-motor behaviors,  such   as
eye  and  arm movements, posture adjustments and so on, in a very rapid manner.
On-line agents---or zombies as we call them---operating in the here and now and
lacking direct access to working memory, are complemented by one or more
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networks for object classification, recognition and identification. It is these latter
ones that give rise to conscious perception.
The exact relationship between zombie and conscious systems is unclear. In
one reading, these might coexist as anatomical distinct streams in the brain. Milner
and Goodale (1995) suggest that the on-line system mainly uses the dorsal visual
stream (see the chapter by Ungerleider & Pasternak), implying that all activity in
this pathway is unconscious. They consider the ventral stream (see the chapters by
Tanaka and by Kanwisher), on the other hand, to be largely conscious. Another
interpretation holds that zombie and conscious systems share the same anatomical
substrate but corresponds to different modes. For instance,  feedforward activity
that rapidly moves through the relevant networks to trigger motor action  might
well correspond to on-line behaviors while sustained firing activity that is
modulated by cortico-cortical feedback, in particular from prefrontal cortex,
might be a critical component of the NCC.
The broad properties of the two hypothetical entities -- the on-line and the
seeing systems -- are shown in the Table, following Milner and Goodale (1995; for
critical evaluation and alternative views, see Boussaoud, di Pellegrino, and Wise,
1996 and Franz et al., 2000).  The on-line system may have multiple subcomponents
(e.g., for eye movements, for arm movements, for body posture adjustment).
Under normal conditions, on-line behaviors coexist with conscious percepts,
thoughts or actions. Indeed, there is evidence that in some circumstances the
seeing system can interfere with the on-line system (Rossetti, 1998).
ON-LINE SYSTEM SEEING SYSTEM
Visual inputs handled must be simple can be complex
Motor outputs stereotyped many
responses possible responses
Minimum time needed for response short longer
Effect of a few seconds' delay may not work can still work
Coordinates used egocentric object-centered
Certain perceptual illusions not effective seen
Koch & Crick  Consciousness                                                                                           6
Conscious no      yes
Comparison of the Hypothetical On-line System and the Seeing System
(based on Milner and Goodale, 1995)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One striking piece of evidence for on-line behaviors comes from studies on
patient D.F. Her brain has diffuse damage produced by carbon-monoxide poisoning.
She is able to see color and texture very well but is very deficient in seeing
orientation and form.  In spite of this, she is very good at catching a ball.  She can
“post” her hand or a card into an elongated slot without difficulty, though she is
unable to report the slot’s orientation. If the stimulus is removed and DF's is
asked to delay her response by a few seconds, she is unable to properly orient her
hand. That is, on-line visuo-motor behaviors do not have access to working memory
since they operate in the here and now. This observation might be used to
distinguish all manner of zombie actions from conscious ones.
We suspect that while these suggestions about two systems are on the right
lines, they are probably oversimplified.  The little that is known of the
neuroanatomy would suggest that there are likely to be multiple cortical streams,
with numerous anatomical connections between them (Distler et al., 1993). For
example, recent data implicates the superior temporal cortex in humans as critical
for spatial awareness, attention and exploration (Karnath, 2001). It is difficult to
assign this brain area unambiguously to either the ventral or the dorsal pathway,
raising the possibility that it acts as an interface between the two. Furthermore,
the neuroanatomy does not suggest that the sole pathway goes up to the highest
levels of the visual system, and from there to the highest levels of the prefrontal
system and then down to the motor output.  There are numerous pathways from
intermediate levels of the visual system to intermediate frontal regions.
Other examples of residual visual behaviors in the absence of conscious,
visual sensation in brain-damaged patients include blindsight (see the chapter by
Weiskrantz) and the visual neglect syndrome (Driver and Mattingley, 1998). In
extinction, the presence of a visual stimulus in the intact hemifield successfully
competes with the stimulus in the lesioned hemifield: the latter one is simply not
perceived. Typically, these symptoms are associated with lesions in the
contralateral posterior parietal lobes (for an alternative view, see Karnath, 2001).
This has been taken as prima facie evidence for the importance of these areas for
visual consciousness.
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Bilateral damage of both parietal lobes can give rise to Balint syndrome or
simultanagnosia. Such patients only see one thing at a time, neglecting everything
else but the one object that currently  captures their attention at the exclusion of
anything else (Rafal, 1997). Yet the critical point is that they can still see
something. This leads us to conclude that the areas involved in spatial neglect are
not strictly necessary for conscious vision  per se. It is likely, though, that parietal
areas provide attentional modulation of processing in the ventral pathway by
biasing the competition among neuronal assemblies there.
Finally, two groups of people that appear to function, on occasion, in the
absence of conscious sensations are a subset of patients with  complex partial
seizures (Penfield and Jasper, 1954) and sleep-walkers (Revonuso et al., 2000).
Both can execute routine behaviors, including mumbling, walking, moving furniture,
driving and other automatic behaviors without being able to interact (e.g. have a
conversation) with their environment nor recall anything that occurred during the
seizure or the somnambulistic episode. It is possible that the NCC is shut down yet
enough specific nervous activity remains to support zombie behaviors (Koch and
Crick, 2001).
All of this evidence suggests that many behaviors occur in the absence of
conscious sensation. This offers the possibility of a contrastive program, in which
the neural mechanisms underlying automatic or zombie-behaviors are contrasted
with those underlying any one conscious sensation, the NCC proper. However, the
existence of unconscious behaviors also implies that one has to exercise great
caution when working with animals, babies or severely aphasic patients. It
therefore becomes important to develop criteria to distinguish opto-motor
behaviors controlled by zombie agents from those that require consciousness.
Interposing a delay of a few seconds between the visual stimulus and the required
response seems currently the most promising litmus test.
The existence of a host of zombie behaviors also raises the question of why
we need consciousness at all? Why aren’t we large bundles of on-line behaviors? We
proposed (Crick and Koch, 1998) that while this might be appropriate for animals
with a limited behavioral repertoire, such as a fruit-fly, this would not do for
mammals with their enormous range of behaviors. Instead evolution produced a
general purpose system which can deal with all sort of contingencies and permits
the animal to plan in parallel with a host of very rapid but special-purpose and
stereo-typed zombie behaviors. The price is speed: consciousness reflection and
planning requires a fraction of a second or longer.
4. The Nature of the Visual Representation
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We argued (Crick and Koch, 1995b) that to be aware of an object or event, the
brain has to construct a multilevel, explicit, symbolic interpretation of part of the
visual scene.  By multilevel, we mean, in psychological terms, different levels such
as those that correspond, for example, to lines or eyes or faces.  In neurological
terms, we mean, loosely, the different levels in the visual hierarchy (Felleman and
Van Essen, 1991).
The important idea is that the representation must be explicit. The word is
here used in the sense that it should be easy to infer the presence or absence of
the feature that is made explicit in the cellular response (one could formalize this
using a perceptron).
Notice that while the information needed to represent a face is contained
in the firing of the ganglion cells in the retina, the retina lacks an explicit
representation for faces.
The evidence from brain damage, especially in humans, suggests that
certain parts of the cortex are essential for a person to be conscious of certain
aspects of the visual sensation or percept, such as color, motion, faces, etc.  Zeki
and Bartels (1999) have, very reasonably, described such a piece of the cortex as
an essential node for that aspect of the percept, though a “key node” might be a
better term.  What should be considered “one aspect” must be decided by
experiment.  Thus “motion” is not necessarily a single aspect.  Indeed there is
evidence from brain damage (Vaina and Cowey, 1996) that F.D., a patient with
rather limited brain damage, is impaired in the detection of second-order or
texture-based motion but does perceive first-order or intensity-based motion.
The term should not be taken to imply that a person who possessed only the
relevant essential node would be conscious of that aspect of the percept.  It is
highly probable that to produce that aspect of consciousness the node would have
to interact with other parts of the brain.  A node is a node, not a network. The
point is that damage to that essential node would specifically remove that
particular aspect of the sensation or percept, while leaving other aspects
relatively intact.
The concept of an essential node is an important one.  It implies that if
there is no essential node for some possible aspect of consciousness the subject
cannot be conscious of it.  Zihl’s patient (Zihl, Von Cramon and Mai, 1983) can see
a car, but if the car is moving she does not see its movement because the
essential nodes for movement have been damaged.  So it is important not to
assume that, for example, the brain can necessarily consciously detect some
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particular change in its firing activity.  It will not be able to do so unless there is
some essential node to consciously register that type of change.
 It is plausible that an explicit representation (at an essential node) might be
a smallish group of neurons employing coarse coding to represent some aspect of
the visual scene.  In the case of a particular face, all of these neurons can fire to
somewhat face-like objects (see the chapter by Rolls).  We suggest that one set of
such neurons will be all of one type, will probably be fairly close together, and will
all project to roughly the same place.  If all such groups of neurons (there may be
several of them, stacked one above the other) were destroyed, then the person
would not see a face, though he or she might be able to see the parts of a face,
such as the eyes, the nose, the mouth, etc.  There are other places in the brain
that explicitly represent other aspects of a face, such as the emotion the face is
expressing or its angle of gaze.
An attractive proposition is that the stimulus feature common to most
neurons within a cortical column is what is made explicit there. Thus, orientation is
one feature explicitly represented in V1, as is the direction and speed of motion in
area V5. We call this the columnar hypothesis. Note that an explicit representation
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the NCC. As outlined in section 7, it
matters a great deal where these neurons project.
A representation of an object or an event will usually consist of
representations of many of the relevant aspects of it, and these are likely to be
distributed, to some degree, over different parts of the visual system.  How these
properties are bound together is known as one aspect of the binding problem (see
the chapter by Singer). It is possible that in many cases the firing of pyramidal
neurons in all layers within a column that code for the object need to be
synchronized for this to occur.
Much neural activity, most of which is probably unconscious, is usually
needed for the brain to construct a representation.  It may prove useful to
consider this unconscious activity as the computations needed to find the best
interpretation, while the interpretation itself may be considered to be the results
of the computations, only some of which we are then conscious of.  To judge from
our perception, the results probably have something of a winner-take-all character.
In the past we wondered whether only some types of specific neurons might
express the NCC. Silence these and a very specific loss of some specific content of
consciousness might occur (like the inability to perceive a certain type of motion).
A weaker version of this hypothesis holds that the NCC depends on some crucial
biophysical or anatomical property of some network in the brain. Again, blocking
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this feature could lead to a very specific loss of some aspect of subjective
feelings.
An alternative possibility is that the NCC is necessarily global,  usually
identified with some emergent property of very large and diffuse assemblies of
neurons. In one extreme form this would mean that, at one time or another, any
neuron in cortex and associated structures could express the NCC, and  it would be
foolish to locate consciousness at the level of  single neurons.
These possibilities are non-exclusive: it is possible that both local as well as
global properties of the brain are necessary for consciousness to occur. While our
thinking over the past decade has stressed particular neuronal mechanisms, that of
Edelman and Tononi has focused on certain global aspects of networks (their
dynamic core hypothesis; Edelman and Tononi, 2000). Both ideas might be valid.
Conscious visual representations are likely to be distributed over more than
one area of the cerebral cortex and possibly over certain subcortical structures as
well.  We have argued that in primates---contrary to received opinion---they are
not located in primary visual cortex (see below).
Whatever the NCC is, it must be present in the two hemispheres. Careful
study of split brain patients demonstrates that one hemisphere usually supports
language while the linguistic competence of the other is severely reduced. Yet,
even this non-dominant hemisphere can clearly reason, respond purposefully and
plan complex behaviors.  From this one can conclude that split-brain patients have,
within the confine of a single skull,  two brains with two conscious minds (Sperry,
1974; Bogen, 1997).
5.  What is Essential for Visual Consciousness?
The term “visual consciousness” almost certainly covers a variety of
processes.  When one is actually looking at a visual scene, the experience is very
vivid.  This should be contrasted with the much less vivid and less detailed visual
images produced by trying to remember the same scene (a vivid recollection is
usually called a hallucination).  We are concerned here mainly with normal vivid
experiences. It is possible that our dimmer visual recollections, imagery, are mainly
due to the back pathways in the visual hierarchy biasing the “noise” in earlier
stages of the system.
Some form of very short-term memory seems almost essential for
consciousness, but this memory may be very transient, lasting for only a fraction of
a second.  The existence of iconic memory, as it is called, is well-established
experimentally (Coltheart, 1983; Gegenfurtner and Sperling, 1993).
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Psychophysical evidence for short-term memory (Potter, 1976) suggests
that if we do not pay attention to some part or aspect of the visual scene, our
memory of it is very transient and can be overwritten (masked) by the following
visual stimulus.  This probably explains many of our fleeting memories when we
drive a car over a familiar route.  If we do pay attention (e.g., a child crossing the
road) our recollection of this can be longer lasting.
Our impression that at any moment we see all of a visual scene very clearly
and in great detail is illusory, partly due to ever-present eye movements and partly
due to our ability to use the scene itself as a readily available form of memory,
since in most circumstances the scene usually changes rather little over a short
span of time (O'Regan, 1992; see the chapter by Simmons). What we can grasp
very rapidly and pre-attentively is the gist of a scene (Mack and Rock,  1998;
Wolfe, 1998). It is this that provides us with the illusion of being able to
apprehend the entire scene at once. It is likely that there are neurons at the
higher visual levels whose firing directly encodes the gist of that scene. These
neurons would then be key culprits for mediating the sensation of seeing
everything at once.
Although working memory expands the time frame of consciousness, it is not
obvious that it is essential for consciousness.  It seems to us that working memory
is a mechanism for maintaining one or a small sequence of items in consciousness.
In a similar way, the episodic memory enabled by the hippocampal system (Zola-
Morgan and Squire, 1993) is not essential for consciousness, though a person
without it is severely handicapped.
Is attention necessary for consciousness?  It seems that it is enriched by
visual attention, though top-down attention is not essential for visual consciousness
to occur (Rock, Linnett, Grant, and Mac, 1992; Braun and Julesz, 1998).  Attention
is broadly of two types:  bottom-up, saliency-driven and task-independent; and top-
down, produced by the planning parts of the brain.  Visual attention can be directed
to either a location in the visual field or to one or more objects.  The neural
mechanisms that achieve this are still being debated.  But they are likely to involve
biasing the competition among groups of cells coding for neighbouring objects in
favor of the attended one (Desimone and Duncan, 1995).  See our earlier discussion
of neglect and Balint syndromes.
6. How does the timing of events affect the percept?
The timing of the emergence of consciousness has been called microgenesis
(Bachmann, 2000). We can easily see something of a visual input, such as a flash of
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lightening, even though it lasts for a very short time, provided it is strong enough.
Bloch’s law states that for stimulus duration less than about a tenth of a second
(for a diffuse flash) the brightness of the stimulus appears the same provided the
product of its intensity and its duration is constant.  In some sense the system is
integrating the input over some short time interval.
How bright does a flash of light appear if its intensity is kept the same but
its duration varies from trial to trial?  This can be estimated by comparing its
apparent brightness with the brightness of a similar but constant light.  A typical
result has been described by Efron (1967).  As the duration increases the light
appears more intense until, for a duration of about 40 msec, it reaches a maximum
after which the subjective brightness declines to a steady value (Fig. 1A). As Efron
has pointed out this description can be misleading.  It expresses the results of
multiple trials, each one for one particular duration of flash.  It does not show
what a person experiences at a single trial.  That is, for a flash of length of say
125 msec the subject does not see the brightness of the flash increasing rapidly
and then decreasing somewhat.  On the contrary she reports that she saw a steady
brightness.  This distinction, which has been widely overlooked, is an important one.
The results suggest that the NCC comes into being abruptly rather than
gradually.  Once the relevant neural activity reaches some threshold a constant
percept of brightness results, at least for a short time.
Instead of a single flash of light, what do we see if a complex scene, such as
people dining in a restaurant, is flashed for different short durations?  The
general result is that for very short exposures one perceives the general nature of
the scene, the gist, as mentioned earlier.  As the flash is made longer we can
report more details.  Once again, in any one trial we do not see the scene change.
We just see more for longer flashes.
This might suggest that some of the higher levels of the visual hierarchy
reach the necessary threshold for consciousness before the lower levels do.
Possibly the lower levels need some feedback from the higher levels to boost their
activity above threshold.
In “masking,” two (or more) inputs are involved (Bachmann, 2000; Enns and
DiLollo, 2000).  When the two inputs blend this is sometimes referred to as
integrative masking, though the term blending might be preferable.  Pattern
masking is when two rather different spatially superimposed patterns of contours
interfere.  When two patterns are not superimposed but spatially adjacent, the
interference is called metacontrast.  Masking can also occur when the masking
pattern does not abut the target pattern but is nearby.  This is now called object-
substitution masking.
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Suppose a red circular disc and an otherwise identical green circle disc are
flashed simultaneously onto the same place in the retina.  Not surprisingly the
subject sees a yellow disc.  If the red disc alone is flashed first, for only 10 msec,
immediately followed by the green disc for 10 msec, the subject does not see a red
disc turning green, but just a yellow disc.  The yellow has a greenish tinge
compared to the yellow produced when they are simultaneous.  If the green disc
comes first, the yellow is a little redder (Yund, Morgan and Efron, 1983). The
subject perceives a mixture of the inputs, with a bias towards the later one—this
turns out to be a general rule.  This suggests some form of integration, with the
later signal having a somewhat greater weight.  If one disc appears 100 msec
before the other, little blending occurs.  This suggests that, in this instance, the
integration time is less than 100 msec.
When masking produces interference this is because in some sense the mask
is competing with the target.  The subject can easily report the target if there is
no mask, but if the mask is spatially superimposed on the target, and occurs about
the same time, his responses are mostly at chance—he reports he did not see the
target.  He does better if there is a delay of 100 msec or so between the onset of
the target and the onset of the mask.  The mask interferes with processing of the
target in the integration period leading up to consciousness.  It is plausible that
once some kind of neural activity due to the target has reached a certain
threshold, the following mask cannot interfere with it so easily.  This suggests that
the conscious activity may show hysteresis---as Libet (1973) has claimed---since
the activity is probably held above a threshold to some extent by some mechanism,
such as loops with positive feedback (Fig. 1B). This activity correspond to the NCC
for the attribute encoded by the essential node, say the target's brightness,
location or color. The attribute remains consciously accessible until the activity
dips below a lower threshold  (Fig. 1B) at which point it becomes  perceptually
invisible.
In meta-contrast, the subject can see the target if the onset of the target
and mask are simultaneous, but fails to see it if the onset of the mask is delayed
by a short period, typically 50 to 100 msec or so.  This is presumably because the
target and the mask are initially activating different places in the brain, and it
takes time for their activities to interfere with each other.
The most interesting case is object-substitution masking; that is, when the
target and mask are spatially separate.  No masking occurs if the target and the
mask come into view simultaneously and disappear simultaneously.  Masking does
occur if, instead, the mask continues beyond the disappearance of the target.  No
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masking occurs if the target is especially salient, or if attention is focused on the
target location beforehand.
The phenomenon of “masked priming”  implies that (unconscious) processing
of the masked target proceeds to fairly high levels. That is, some level of priming
occurs whether or not the prime was masked, suggesting that the physiological
correlate of priming (short-term synaptic changes?) can occur in high-level cortical
areas without giving rise to consciousness.
Enns and DiLollo (2000) suggest that one is not conscious of the details of
the target until the activity it has produced first reach a higher level (when there
is integration) and then flows back to a lower level (possibly iteratively).  They
propose that it is at one of the lower levels that the activity of the sustained mask
interferes with conscious seeing, presumably of the details of the pattern.
Until recently visual psychologists did not relate their results to the
complex organization of the primate visual system.  The study of masking in the
alert monkey by neurophysiologists has only just begun (Macknik and Livingstone,
1998; Thompson and Schall, 2000).  A careful study of the neurophysiological
effects of masking should throw light on the processes leading to consciousness, on
the integration times for the signal to reach above the thresholds for
consciousness and on the ways interference works.  In general the times involved
seem to range from 50 to 100 msec, to 200 msec or more.  This upper limit
approaches the typical time between eye movements.
The picture that emerges from these speculations is a rather curious one.
It bears some resemblance to Dennett’s multiple drafts model (Dennett, 1991),
though Dennett’s ideas, though suggestive, are not precise enough to be considered
scientific.  The content of consciousness instead of being a continuous ever-
changing flux may be more like a rapid series of 'static snapshots'.  Movement, like
other attributes, is signaled in a static way by special neurons.  That is, movement
is not symbolized by a change in time of the symbols for position, but by special
neural symbols that represent movement of one sort or another.  If the essential
nodes for these symbols are lost, as in Zihl’s patient, then though she can see the
moving car she cannot see it moving.
There is little evidence for a regular clock in the brain with a mechanism
that integrates over intervals of constant duration and then starts afresh over the
next interval, sometime called a quantized clock.  The duration of a snapshot is
likely to depend on various factors, such as contrast, saliency, competition, and so
on.  Purves and his colleagues (Purves, Paydafar and Andrews, 1996) have described
several psychological effects, such as a wagon-wheel effect under constant
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illumination, which hint that there are some clock-like effects in vision.  This would
be worth further study.
The brain has a problem with time, since time is needed to express a symbol
(by neurons firing, a process spread out over time) so it is not surprising if it
symbolized changes in time, such as movements, in a special way, and differences in
time in another way.
We are dealing with an intrinsically parallel system to which we have limited
access introspectively.  This is probably why we find it so hard to understand how
it works.  This does not mean that we cannot usefully analyze it into smaller parts
that interact dynamically, just as the “holistic” properties of a complex organic
molecule, such as a protein, can be understood by the interactions of its many
amino acids and the atoms of which they are made.  In the brain an essential node
may be a useful unit of analysis.  It may turn out that the best way to describe the
NCC for any one percept is the activities at the relevant essential nodes and their
dynamic interactions.  This suggestion resembles the dynamic core of Edelman and
Tononi (2000).
7.  Bistable percepts
Perhaps the most relevant experimental approach to tracking down the footsteps
of the NCC for now is to study the behavior of single neurons while the subject is
looking at something that produces a bistable percept.  The visual input, apart from
minor eye movements, is constant; but the subject’s percept can take one of two
alternative forms.  This happens, for example, when one looks at a drawing of the
Necker cube. Which neurons follow the constant retinal input and which ones the
variable percept?
A more practical alternative is to study binocular rivalry (Myerson, Miezin,
and Allman, 1981).  If the visual input into each eye is different, but perceptually
overlapping, one usually sees the visual input as received by one eye alone, then by
the other one, then by the first one, and so on.  This approach has been explored
by Logothetis and his colleagues by training macaque monkeys to report which of
two rivalrous inputs they saw.  The fairly similar distribution of switching times
strongly suggests that monkeys and humans perceive these bistable visual inputs in
the same way.  In the first set of experiments Logothetis and Schall (1989)
investigated neurons in area MT (also referred to as V5).  The stimuli were
vertically drifting horizontal gratings.  Of the relevant neurons, only about 35%
were modulated according to the monkey's reported percept.  Surprisingly, half of
these responded in the opposite direction to the one expected.  Leopold and
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Logothetis (1996)  used stationary gratings.  The orientation was chosen in each
case to be optimal for the neuron studied, and orthogonal to it in the other eye.
They recorded how the neuron fired during several alterations of the reported
percept.  While only a small fraction of foveal V1/V2 neurons followed the percept,
about 40% of neurons in V4 did.  Interestingly, about half of V1/V2 cells were
anticorrelated with the stimulus.
The results of the Sheinberg  and Logothetis (1997) experiments are
striking. Instead of using binocular rivalry, they exploited a related paradigm: flash
suppression. An image is presented to one eye for a second or longer. A different
image is then flashed into the other eye. The former image is perceptually
completely suppressed by the novel pattern, even though the first image is still
present on the retina (Fig. 2). The mechanisms underlying flash suppression are
unrelated to either forward masking, adaptation or  any other  mechanism that
reduces the visibility  of the ipsilateral flash (Wolfe,  1984). Flash suppression is
easy to obtain, is very robust and can be exactly timed, unlike the transitions
occurring during binocular rivalry.
Sheinberg and Logothetis (1997) recorded from individual neurons in the
monkey’s superior temporal sulcus (STS) and inferior temporal cortex (IT).
Overall, approximately 90% of the relevant neurons in STS and IT reliably predict
the perceptual state of the animal.  That is, these neurons follow the percept
rather than the retinal stimulus. Moreover, many of these neurons respond in an
almost all-or-none fashion, firing strongly for one percept, yet only at background
levels for the alternative one.
Although the vast bulk of electrophysiological single-cell experiments are
carried out in animals, under exceptional circumstances such recordings are
possible in humans.  These occur in a subset of pharmacologically intractable
epilepsy patients undergoing evaluation for surgical treatment. Kreiman, Koch and
Fried (2000) found many  neurons to be tuned for specific categories of visually
presented stimuli (e.g. famous people such as politicians or entertainers, faces of
unknown actors expressing various emotions, animals or cars). Many of these cells
fire selectively when their preferred stimulus is perceived but not when it is
perceptually suppressed during flash suppression (Kreiman, Fried and Koch, 2002).
About two thirds of a total of 48 selective medial temporal lobe (MTL) neurons
followed the percept (Figs. 2 and 3). No neuron responded in a significant manner
to its preferred visual stimulus if this stimulus was physically present on the
retina, but perceptually suppressed.  That is, there is no evidence for a neuronal
representation of perceptually suppressed, that is unconscious, stimuli in the
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higher echelons of the visual hierarchy. Thus, both IT neurons in the macaque as
well as MTL neurons in humans follow the subject’s conscious percept.
Of course, without further experiments it is not possible to distinguish
between correlation and causation. It does not automatically imply that just
because a particular neuron follows the percept, its firing is part of the NCC.  Do
the MTL neurons carry a mere copy of the neuronal signal expressed already in IT
for transfer into working memory or are neurons in hippocampus, amygdala  and
entorhinal cortex in normals necessary for conscious perception? Where are these
neurons projecting to? It is, at the moment, technically difficult to do this, but it
is essential to have this knowledge, or it will be almost impossible to understand
the neural nature of consciousness.
8.  What is the Role of V1 in Visual Consciousness
We have argued (Crick and Koch, 1995b) that one is not directly conscious of the
features represented by the neural activity in primary visual cortex.  Activity in V1
may be necessary for vivid and veridical visual consciousness (as is activity in the
retina), but we suggest that the firing of none of the neurons in V1 directly
correlates with what we consciously see.
Our reasons are that at each stage in the visual hierarchy the explicit
aspects of the representation we have postulated is re-coded.  We also assumed
that any neurons expressing an aspect of the NCC must project directly, without
re-coding, to at least some of the parts of the brain that plan voluntary action--
that is what we have argued seeing is for.  We think that these plans are made in
some parts of frontal cortex (see below).
The neuroanatomy of the macaque monkey shows that V1 cells do not project
directly to any part of frontal cortex (see the references in Crick and Koch,
1995b).
The strategy to verify or falsify this and similar hypotheses is to relate the
receptive field properties of individual neurons in V1 or elsewhere to perception in
a quantitative manner.  Ultimately, this correlation has to be made on an individual
trial-to-trial basis.  If the structure of perception does not map to the receptive
field properties of V1 cells, it is unlikely that these neurons directly give rise to
consciousness.  In the presence of a correlation between perceptual experience
and the receptive field properties of V1 cells, it is unclear whether these cells just
correlate with consciousness or directly give rise to it.  In that case, further
experiments need to be carried out to untangle the exact relationship between
neurons and perception.
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Psychophysical evidence is broadly consistent with our proposal. The study
by He, Cavanagh and Intriligator (1996) exploit a common visual aftereffect.  If a
subject stares for a fraction of a minute at a horizontal grating, and is then tested
with a faint grating at the same location to decide whether it is oriented vertically
or horizontally, the subject's sensitivity for detecting a horizontal grating will be
reduced.  This adaptation is orientation specific--the sensitivity for vertical
gratings is almost unchanged--and disappears quickly.  He and colleagues projected
a single patch of grating onto a computer screen some 25 degrees from the
fixation point.  It was clearly visible and their subjects showed the predictable
orientation-selective adaptation effect.  Adding one or more similar patches of
gratings to either side of the original grating removes the lines of the grating from
visibility; it is “masked.”  Subjectively, one still sees “something" at the location of
the original grating, but one is unable to make out its orientation, even when given
unlimited viewing time.  Yet despite this inability to “see" the adapting stimulus,
the aftereffect was as strong and as specific to the orientation of the “invisible"
grating as when the grating was visible.  What this shows is that visual awareness
must occur at a higher stage in the visual hierarchy than orientation-specific
adaptation.  This aftereffect is thought to be mediated by oriented neurons in V1
and beyond, implying that the NCC must be located past this stage.
Another case in point is the observation that very high frequency gratings
that are perceptually indistinguishable from a uniform field nevertheless produce
robust orientation-dependent aftereffects (He and MacLeod, 2001) The presence
of aftereffects from stimuli that are not consciously perceived (Blake and Fox,
1974) indicates that stimulus properties must be represented outside of
awareness. Thus, activity in V1 often does not correlate with awareness.
These inferences from behavior are complemented by direct
electrophysiological measurements of neuronal activity in V1 in macaque monkeys.
These show that perceptual report (presumably reflecting awareness) and the
mean firing activity  in V1 can change completely independently. For example,
disparity-selective cells in V1 differentiate between local depth cues even when
these do not give rise to an overall depth percept or  may respond in an identical
manner to two depth cues that yield very different global depth percepts
(Cumming and Parker, 1997). This suggests that single V1 cells sensitive to
binocular disparity represent a first critical stage for generation of stereo cues,
but that conscious perception of depth is most likely generated further upstream.
A similar lack of correlation between perceptual experience and the response
properties of V1 cells can be seen during blinks. They produce profound and
frequent interruptions in retinal stimulation, yet barely impinge on our visual
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experience. Cells in the supragranular layers of V1 show responses to visual
stimulation that decrease substantially during reflex blinks (Gawne and Martin,
2000) and this reduction is significantly more pronounced than when there is an
equally long gap in visual stimulation. Similarly, microsaccades that occur continually
do not alter our impression of the world but are reflected in the activity of
neurons in V1 (Martinez-Conde, Macknik and Hubel, 2000). Lastly, when two
isoluminant colors are alternated at frequencies beyond 10 Hz, humans perceive
only a single fused color with a minimal sensation of brightness flicker.  In spite of
the perception of color fusion, color opponent cells in primary visual cortex of two
alert macaque monkeys follow high-frequency flicker well above heterochromatic
fusion frequencies (Gur and Snodderly, 1997).  In other words, neuronal activity in
V1 can clearly represent certain retinal stimulation that is not perceived.
Changes in conscious perception can also occur in the absence of concomitant
variations of neuronal activity in V1. As mentioned above, the majority of the
V1/V2 cells recorded by Leopold and Logothetis (1996)  do not co-vary with the
animal’s behavior during binocular rivalry. Instead, their firing reflects stimulus
properties. Recently, two neuroimaging studies in humans have presented evidence
arguing for a stronger role for V1 in binocular rivalry and hence, by implication,
visual awareness. The most popular form of functional neuroimaging is Blood
Oxygenation-Level-Dependent (BOLD) functional MRI. BOLD measures a
component of the hemodynamic response associated with local neural activity (for
the exact relationship between the two, see Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath and
Oeltermann,  2001). Averaged over the whole of human V1, reliable fluctuations in
BOLD contrast activity are observed (Polonsky, Blake, Braun and Heeger, 2000).
The amplitude of these fluctuations is about half as large as those evoked by non-
rivalrous stimuli, and even larger in the part of V1 associated with the blind spot
representation which contains cells receiving only monocular input from the non-
blind spot eye (Tong and Engel, 2001). The reasons for this discrepancy are not yet
clear but might well involve the complex nature of the relationship between single
cell activity and BOLD measurements (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath and
Oeltermann, 2001). In particular, it is possible that feedback activity from higher
cortical areas to lower ones does give rise to metabolic demand in the lower area
due to the associated synaptic activity and so results in enhanced BOLD contrast.
Yet the feedback is, by itself, not sufficiently powerful to give rise to spiking in
the V1 cells. Other fMRI BOLD studies in humans show a poor correlation between
V1 activity and visual awareness (for a review, see Rees, Kreiman and Koch, 2002).
Note that our hypothesis is not a simple one to prove, since it applies to all
V1 cell populations. Furthermore, the existence of a strong relationship between V1
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activity and percept does not, of course, imply causation. We hope that further
neuroanatomical work will make our hypothesis plausible for humans.  If correct, it
would narrow the search to areas of the brain farther removed from the sensory
periphery.
9.  The Frontal Lobe Hypothesis
As mentioned several times, we hypothesize that the NCC must have access to
explicitly encoded visual information and directly project into the planning stages
of the brain, associated with the frontal lobes in general and with prefrontal
cortex in particular (Fuster, 1997).  We would therefore predict that patients
unfortunate enough to have lost their entire prefrontal cortex on both sides
(including Broca's area) would not be visually conscious, although they might still
have well-preserved, but unconscious, visual-motor abilities.  No such patient is
known to us (not even Brickner's famous patient; for an extensive discussion, see
Damasio and Anderson, 1993).  The visual abilities of any “frontal lobe” patient
needs to be carefully evaluated using a battery of appropriate psychophysical
tests.
The fMRI study of the blindsight patient G.Y. (Sahraie et al., 1997) provides
direct evidence for our view by revealing that prefrontal areas 46 and 47 are
active when G.Y. is aware of a moving stimulus.
Findings of neurons in the inferior prefrontal cortex (IPC) of the macaque
that respond selectively to faces--and that receive direct input from regions
around STS and the inferior temporal gyrus that are well known to contain face-
selective neurons--is very encouraging (Scalaidhe, Wilson and Goldman-Rakic,
1997).  This raises the question of why would face cells be represented in both IT
and IPC.  It is unlikely that exactly the same information is represented at two
different locations so it will be important to find out in what way they differ.
Large-scale lesion experiments carried out in the monkey suggest that the
absence of frontal lobes leads to complete blindness (Gazzaniga, 1966; Nakamura
and Mishkin, 1986).  One would hope that future monkey experiments reversibly
(by cooling and/or injection of GABA agonists) inactivate specific prefrontal areas
and demonstrate the specific loss of abilities linked to visual perception while
visual-motor behaviors -- mediated by the on-line system -- remain intact.
Some cognitive scientists (in particular Jackendoff, 1987) have argued for
an “Intermediate-Level” theory of consciousness in which neither early sensory
processing (the "outer world") nor high-level three-dimensional information or
thoughts (the "inner world") are directly accessible to consciousness. The
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Intermediate-Level” hypothesis raises the intriguing possibility that although much
of the  frontal lobes might be necessary for consciousness, the NCC  might be
preferentially located in more intermediate levels of cortex,  such as the inferior
temporal lobes (for a more detailed discussion of this and some experimental
ramifications,  see Crick and Koch, 2000).
10.  Where are We and Where Should We be Going?
We reviewed the evidence in favor of the hypothesis that there might be
anatomically localized neurons or neural pathways whose level of spiking activity
mediates consciousness. The NCC is not likely to be found in V1, but among neurons
in the ventral pathway (in particular in and around area IT), and in its recipient
zones in the medial temporal and frontal lobes. Neurons from posterior parietal
areas can modulate the competition in this stream, without being strictly necessary
for conscious perception.
It is likely that a conscious percept requires that the relevant activity in the
relevant neurons exceeds some minimal amount. It is possible that such a threshold
can only be exceeded by some type of feedback  activity from a higher cortical
area (Pollen, 1999; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000). Furthermore, this minimal activity
might have to persist for a minimum amount of time.
Yet the average firing activity need not be the only relevant variable. An
alternate hypothesis is that consciousness might be associated with specific types
of neural activity, such as oscillatory or synchronized discharges. These two
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and a combination of synchronous activity
and neural spike rates might be an important attribute of  the NCC.  Indeed, we
suggested early on that synchronized oscillations in the broad “40 Hz” range may
underlie feature integration and form a substrate for visual consciousness,
although the idea remains controversial (Crick and Koch, 1990; Engel and Singer,
2001; see the chapter by Singer). In general, a synchronized neuronal population
will be more efficient in evoking a strong postsynaptic response compared to a
network of independently firing neurons; that is, it carries a more powerful
postsynaptic 'punch'. The brain may use correlated firing for more than one
purpose. In particular, it might embody the effects of top-down attention. As
consciousness frequently involves the suppression of competing percepts, such
synchronized and oscillatory firing might often accompany the NCC without being
strictly necessary. Conversely, synchronized firing might also underlie other
processes, such a figure-ground segregation, so that their mere presence might
not reliably indicate a NCC.
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At the moment, the most promising experiments to discover the correlates
of visual consciousness are those on bistable percepts which need to be expanded
to  include other brain areas (in particular prefrontal cortex) in both the monkey
and in humans. It is important to discover which neurons express the NCC in each
case (which neuronal subtype, in what layer, and so on), how they fire (do they fire
in bursts; are discharge patterns across neurons synchronized) and, especially,
where they project to.  To assist this, more detailed neuroanatomy of the
connectivity will be needed.  It is also important to discover how the various on-line
systems work, so that one can contrast their (unconscious) neuronal activity with
the NCC (Koch and Crick, 2001).
It will not be enough to show that certain neurons embody the NCC in
certain--limited--visual situations.  Rather, we need to identify the NCC for a
sufficiently large and representative sample of visual inputs. One popular approach
is to study the many visual illusions.  For instance, humans clearly perceive, under
appropriate circumstances, a transient motion aftereffect.  On the basis of fMRI
it has been found that the human equivalent of cortical area MT is activated by the
motion aftereffect (in the absence of any moving stimuli; Tootell et al., 1995).  The
time course of this illusion parallels the time course of activity as assayed using
fMRI.  In order to really pinpoint the NCC, one would need to identify individual
cells expressing this, and similar, visual aftereffects.
This is not to argue that studying visual consciousness constitutes the one
and only means of cracking the mind-brain problem. Investigating other forms of
consciousness might have practical advantages (for instance, the awareness of the
exact US-CS stimulus contingency during certain forms of associative conditioning;
Clark and Squire, 1998). In order to understand consciousness, we need to
understand cerebral cortex. We can only hope to achieve this goal by deliberately
interfering with cortex and its components in a delicate, reversible and transient
manner. Molecular biology is beginning to provide the relevant tools (e.g. Lois, Hong,
Pease, Brown, and Baltimore, 2002). Whether these are best applied to the
macaque’s visual system or to another modality in the more accessible  mouse
remains an open question.
Finding the NCC would only be the  first,  albeit critical,  step in
understanding consciousness. The next biggest challenge would be to bridge the
gap between correlation and causation. For this to occur, we would need to
understand the postsynaptic action of neurons expressing the NCC, what happens
to them in various diseases known to  affect consciousness,  such   as schizophrenia
or autism, and so  on.  And, of  course, a  final theory of  consciousness would have
to explain the central mystery: how a physical system with a particular
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architecture can have feelings and qualia (Chalmers, 1995). After several thousand
years of speculation, it would be very gratifying to solve this puzzle.
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Legends
Figure 1: How does a conscious percept and the neural activity that encodes it
evolve in time? (A) Schematic drawing of the relationship between subjectively
perceived brightness and stimulus duration. A flash of intermediate duration is
perceived as brighter as a flash of much longer duration.  Yet the percept
associated with a single trial does not wax and wane as suggested by this function;
instead it remains constant.  (B) Hypothetical time course of  the critical  activity
at  the  essential node  coding for  the brightness  percept.  Once  this  exceeds
some  amplitude, this NCC  activity is  sustained enough to  project widely
throughout cortex and the subject becomes consciousness of the stimulus and its
brightness.  Awareness is expressed until the  NCC drops below some level (the
two threshold values don't  have to be identical, the phenomena of hysteresis).
Figure 2: Example of a response of a single neuron in the left parahippocampal
gyrus of a human patient during flash suppression. (a) A photo of one of the
Beatles, Paul McCartney, is projected into the right eye of the patient. After one
second, a picture of a house is flashed into the left eye. This novel image
completely suppresses the percept of McCartney and only the house is consciously
seen. (b) The converse situation: a horizontal grating is shown to the left eye.
After 1 sec, the image of McCartney is flashed into the right eye, completely
suppressing the grating percept, although this image is still present on the left
retina. The particular neuron recorded here follows the conscious percept of the
patient, rather than the retinal stimulus. It only fires to its preferred stimulus----
McCartney---whenever the subject perceives this stimulus. From Kreiman, Fried
and Koch (2002).
Figure 3: Averaged normalized spike density functions of twelve medial temporal
lobe (MTL) neurons in human patients during flash suppression that followed the
percept. These cells responded selectively to a specific face or image in the test
set (as in Fig. 2). The light trace corresponds to the response for all trials when a
stimulus from the cell’s effective category was shown monocularly for 1 sec (a) or
during the 0.5 sec long flash presentation period (b). The dark trace corresponds
to the response to all other, ineffective, stimuli (shaded regions are the 95%
confidence intervals). As all subjects perceive the effective stimuli during the
monocular presentation (in a) or during flash suppression (in b), the cellular
responses closely follow the subject’s conscious visual experience. From Kreiman et
al  (2002).
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